Indecency on Cable Television by Hartglass, Lori R.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review
4-1-1984
Indecency on Cable Television
Lori R. Hartglass
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr
Part of the Entertainment and Sports Law Commons
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of
Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact
library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lori R. Hartglass, Indecency on Cable Television, 1 U. Miami Ent. & Sports L. Rev. 79 (1984)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol1/iss1/6
NOTES AND COMMENTS
INDECENCY ON CABLE TELEVISION
As the anti-pornography group, Morality in Media, lobbies
across the country to "put a torpedo into the whole sex industry,
1
pressure mounts upon the entire spectrum of the communications
media to limit the dissemination of potentially offensive material.
The cable television industry has been affected by this crusade for
censorship and.new state statutes and municipal ordinances have
been enacted to regulate programming on cable television.' When
these laws extend to the prohibition of indecent material, they
consistently fail and are held unconstitutional, as a violation of the
first amendment freedom of speech clause. This note examines the
reasons why.
I. THE ELASTICITY OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
The first$ and fourteenth" amendments to the United States
Constitution protect the freedom of speech and expression from
1. Reagan Urged to 'Torpedo' Porn, Miami Herald, Mar. 29, 1983, at 12A, col. 1.
2. See Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164 (D. Utah
1982); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 986 (1982); Krattenmaker and Es-
terow, Censoring Indecent Cable Programs: The New Morality Meets the New Media, 51
FORDHAU L. Rsv. 606 (1983); Note, Indecent Programming on Cable Television and the
First Amendment, 51 Gao. WASH. L REv. 254 (1983); Courts Say Cable Enjoys First
Amendment Rights, The Independent Professional, Feb. 15, 1983, at 14, col. 1; MA Citizens
Panel Backs Cable Obscenity Bill, Multi-channel News, Jan. 31, 1983, at 59, col. 1; Ban
Nudity on Cable TV in Orange, Commissioner Urges, The Orlando Sentinel, Jan. 25, 1983,
at B-1, col. 1; Miami Bans Porn on Cable TV Despite Objections, Jan. 14, 1983, at 4D, col.
1; Statewide Ban on Cable-TV Porn is Proposed in Legislature, The Miami News, Nov. 23,
1982, at 1, col 1.
3. U. S. COsT. AMEND. I. The first amendment provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 'of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech; or of
the press; or the right of the people peacebly to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievance.
4. U.S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV, §1. Section one of the fourteenth amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the ju-
risdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privilege
or immunities of citizens of the United States, or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
1
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infringement by the states. These guarantees apply to the rights of
cable operators to disseminate information.' The states may regu-
late speech or expression only under certain circumstances, and
since these limitations apply to all mediums of communication,
they apply to cable television as well.' Categories of unprotected
speech include "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous
and the insulting or 'fighting' words -'those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace.'"
Even otherwise protected speech may be regulated by reasona-
ble time, place and manner restrictions when required to further
significant governmental interests,$ such as individual privacy' and
the well-being of youth.10 Thus, expressions ordinarily protected
by the first amendment, such as those by means of motion pic-
tures," are not free from government regulations at all times and
all places.1 2 However, the first amendment strictly limits the power
of government to censor content,"3 and permits these time, place
and manner restrictions only when the speaker intrudes into the
5. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1376 (10th Cir.
1981); Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1054 n.70 (8th Cir. 1978); afPd on other
grounds, 440 U. S. 689 (1979); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Weaver v. Jordon, 64 CaL 2d 235, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537, 411 P.2d 289, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 844
(1966).
6. Community Television of Utah,. Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164 (D. Utah
1982).
7. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). See also Cohen v. Califor-
nia, 403 U.S. 15, 19-20 (1971); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485-86 (1957).
8. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63 n.18 (1976).
9. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975). See also Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S 39 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.& 77 (1949).
10. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
11. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wil-
son, 343 US. 495 (1952); Universal Amusement Co., v. Vance, 587 F.2d 159, 164 n. 7 (5th
Cir. 1978).
12. 343 US. at 502. See also Times Film Corp. v.City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 48
(1961).
For example, an ordinance restricting the showing by out4oor theatres of films depict-
ing sexual conduct may be constitutional as to films viewable from private residences but
unconstitutional as to films viewable only from the public street or walkway. People v.
Starview Drive-In Theatre, Inc., 100 IMI. App.3d 624, 427 N.E.2d 201 (1981).
13. See, eg., Ennoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. at 209, Police Dep't of Chi-
cago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. at 97 (Jackson, J., concurring). The government must demonstrate that its
action is narrowly devised to further a substantial and legitimate state interest unrelated to
censorship or the suppression of protected expression. See United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 377 (1968); Genusa v. City of Peoria, 619 F.2d 1203, 1214 (7th Cir. 1980).
[Vol. 1:79
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privacy of the home," when the degree of captivity makes it im-
practical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure'5 or
when the communicative materials are accessible to, and obscene
as to, minors.' 6
The standards for such censorship of content must be clearly
drawn. Criteria, such as "sacrilegious,"" "prejudicial to the best
interests of the people of said City,"" "immoral,""9 "harmful"'0 or
portraying "sexual immorality" ' will not pass constitutional mus-
ter because these terms are too vague and indefinite. Neither the
exhibition of nudity,"2 even as to minors," nor the portrayal of
sex' 4 is by itself sufficient reason to deny first amendment protec-
tion. The context in which nudity and sex are presented is cru-
cial.2 For example, material containing a nude baby26 may be in-
nocent or even educational.
2?
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. Califor-
nia" provided guidelines for permissible and absolute prohibition
of obscene works:
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offen-
sive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable
state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary
artistic, political, or scientific value."
14. See Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
15. See Lehman v.City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
16. See Ernoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 US. at 212; Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. at 629. See also Rabeck v. New York, 391 U.S. 462 (1968); Interstate Circuit Inc. v.
City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (196S).
17. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. at 506.
18. Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952).
19. Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of University of New York, 346 U.S. 587
(1954).
20. Superior Films, Inc. v. Department.of Education, 346 U.S. 587 (1954).
21. Kingsley Int'l. Pictures Corp. v. Regents of University of New York, 360 U.S. 684
(1959).
22. Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. .61 (1981); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153
(1974).
23. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. at 213 n. 10.
24. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Accord, Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S.
153, 161 (1974); Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972).
25. Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 986, 996 (1982).
26. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. at 213.
27. Id. at 211.
28. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
29. Id. at 24. See also Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. at 230; Roth v. United States, 354
1984]
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The Court furnished two examples of what a state statute could
define as prohibited under part (b) of the standard:
(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ulti-
mate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated.
(b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of mas-
turbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of genitals."
The following year, the Court in Hamling v. United States,3'
rejected a vagueness attack on 18 U.S.C. §1461, which forbids the
mailing of "obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile" mate-
riaL" It stated that the examples given in Miller, although not in-
tended to be exhaustive, clearly indicated that there is "a limit be-
yond which neither legislative draftsmen nor juries may go in
concluding that particular material is 'patently offensive"' within
the meaning of Miller's obscenity test."3 To assure the statute's
constitutionality, the Court read Miller's limits into it, and con-
structed §1461 to prohibit the mailing of only obscene material."
Then, in 1978, the Court in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation" in-
terpreted 18 U.S.C. §1464,6 which prohibits the broadcast of ob-
scene, indecent and profane language, to apply to more than ob-
scene material. The Pacifica case involved an afternoon broadcast
by a New York radio station of satirist George Carlin's "Filthy
Words" monologue. A member of the "Morality in Media" organi-
zation complained to the Federal Communications Commission
U.S at 489.
30. 413 U. at 2L
31. 418 U.. 87 (1974).
32 18 U.S.C. 11461 (1976); 18 U.S.C. §1461 (1981). 18 U.S.C. 11461 provides in part:
Mailing obscene or crime-inciting matter
Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article, matter, thing,
device, or substance; an......
h5 declared to be nonmallable matter and ...
Whoever knowingly uses the mails for the mailing, carriage in the mails or
dellivery of anything declared by this section... to be nornailable,... shall be
fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, for
the first such ofense ....
The term "indecent" as used in this section includes matter of a character
tending to incite arson, murder, or assassination.
33 418 U.S. at 114.
34. Id. But the statute defines indecent as matter tending to incite arson, murder or
assassination, and is not limited to the meaning of the word "obscene." See supra note 32.
35. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
36. 18 U.S.C. §1464 (1976). 18 U.S.C. §1464 provides:
Broadcasting obscene language
Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of ra-
dio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than two years, or both.
(Vol. 1:79
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(FCC) that he had heard the broadcast while driving in his car
with his young son.3 7 The Supreme Court upheld the Commission's
determination that the monologue, as broadcast, was "indecent"
within the meaning of §1464, and that the term "indecent" in
§1464 was not restricted to the obscene.s"
The Court distinguished Hamling, where it interpreted the
term "indecent" in 18 U.S.C. §1461 to mean "obscene" to preserve
the statute's constitutionality under Miller. The Court asserted,
"the reasons supporting Hamling's construction of §1461 do not
apply to §1464. Although history of the former revealed a primary
concern with the prurient, the Commission has long interpreted
§1464 as encompassing more than the obscene."'" Instead, the
Court explained that the FCC's definition of indecency does not
necessarily require the component of prurient appeal.4 0 At most, it
includes "patently offensive references to excretory and sexual or-
gans and activities,"' 1 so that the "constitutional protection ac-
corded to a communication containing such.., language need not
be the same in every context."' Hence, the Court found that an
afternoon radio broadcast was one context in which the communi-
cation of patently offensive words dealing with sex and excretion
may be regulated within the purview of the first amendment.'"
However, it did not strike down §1464 as unconstitutional, even
though the statute's language calls for the prohibition of the
broadcast of indecent language at all times. As the statute stands,
it does not distinguish between obscenity and indecency, nor does
it require consideration of the context in which the language is
presented. On its face, §1464 appears to violate Miller, but its con-
37. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 729-30; Federal Communications Commission Reports, 56
F.C.C. 2d 94-95 (1975).
38. 438 US. at 726.
39. 438 U.S. at 741. But see Federal Communications Commission Reports, 26 F.C.C.
2d 408, 412 (1970), where the Commission decided the term "indecent" to have a different
meaning from "obscene" in §1464 by finding support in United States v. Limehouse, 285
U.S. 424 (1932). In that case, the Court construed the word "filthy" in the postal obscenity
law, now §1461, to mean something other than "obscene, lewd, or lascivious," and permitted
a prosecution of the sender of a letter which.. . was "course, vulgar, disgusting, indecent."
(emphasis added). Id. As a reqult, one reason why the Commission viewed the word "inde-
cent" in §1464 to encompass more than the word "obscene" was because the Court origi-
nally found the terms to be different in §1461. See Federal Communications Commission
Reports, 56 F.C.C. 2d 94, 97 (1975). Had the Commission known the Supreme Court would
later decide in Hamling that the terms in §1461 would have the same meaning, perhaps the
Commission would have thought the same for the terms in §1464.
40. 438 U.S. at 741.
41. Id. at 743.
42. Id. at 747.
43. Id. at 745.
1984]
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stitutionality as applied to situations such as those in Pacifica is
now firmly established.
The Court emphasized, however, that its holding was based on
a nuisance rationale in which "context is all-important.
' 4'
The concept requires consideration of a host of variables.
The time of day was emphasized by the Commission. The con-
tent of the program in which the language is used will also affect
the composition of the audience, and differences between radio,
television, and perhaps closed-circuit transmissions may also be
relevant. As Justice Sutherland wrote, a "nuisance may be
merely a right thing in the wrong place - like a pig in the par-
lor instead of the barnyard."... We simply hold that when the
Commission finds that a pig has entered the parlor the exercise
of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is
obscene.'5
Thus, the Court agreed with a determination by the Commis-
sion that the principle of channeling should be borrowed from nui-
sance law and applied to the broadcasting medium. Notwithstand-
ing the language of §1464, the Commission did not intend to place
an absolute prohibition on the broadcast of indecent language but
instead sought to channel this material to times of day when chil-
dren most likely would not be exposed to it. 4" The Court also
found that the Commission's power under §1464 to regulate inde-
cent language and to impose sanctions on licensees who broadcast
it was not forbidden by the anticensorship provision of the Com-
munications Act of 1934.47 This provision merely prohibits the
Commission from editing proposed broadcasts in advance; it does
not prohibit the Commission from reviewing the content of com-
pleted broadcasts.'
44. Id. at 750.
45. Id. at 750-51 (footnote omitted).
46. Id.; Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1977); 438 U.S. 726
(1968); Federal Communications Commission Reports, 59 F.C.C. 2d 892 (1976); Federal
Communications Commission Reports, 56 F.C.C. 2d 94, 98 (1975).
47. 47 U.S.C. 1326 (1976). 47 U.S.C. §326 provides:
Censorship
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Com-
mission the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals trans-
mitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated
or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by
means of radio communication.
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II. BROADCAST MERITS THE LEAST FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
In its analysis of the context of the "Filthy Words" broadcast,
the Court stressed that differences in the characteristics of com-
munications media justify differences in the first amendments
standards applied to them.' 9 The Court provided two explanations
for why broadcasting has received the most limited first amend-
ment protection of all forms of communication. First, is the perva-
sive presence of broadcast media, particularly in the home, where
the individual's right to be left alone outweighs the licensee's first
amendment rights to broadcast.50 "Unlike a book which requires
the deliberate act of purchasing and reading or a motion picture
where admission to public exhibition must be actively sought,
broadcasting is disseminated generally to the public .... It comes
directly into the home and frequently without any advance warn-
ing of its content."51 Even prior warnings do not necessarily pro-
tect viewers form unexpected program content, because people
often tune it at times other than at a program's commencement."
Second, the unique accessibility of broadcast media to children,
even those too young to read, coupled with the government's inter-
est in the "well-being of its youth" justifies special treatment of
the broadcast of indecent language. 3 Thus, when the "Filthy
Words" broadcast was aired during the afternoon on the radio, it
subjected children and "unwilling" adults to unexpected content.
Considering the time of day and the pervasiveness and easy acces-
sibility of the medium, a "pig had entered the parlor," and the
Commission would have been within its authority to impose sanc-
tions on the broadcaster for it.
In prior cases, another justification given for restricting broad-
cast's first amendment protection is the inherent physical limita-
tions of the broadcast spectrum." Broadcast frequencies are a
scarce resource; they are not available to all who may wish to use
them. There is a fixed natural limitation upon the number of sta-
tions that can operate without interfering with each other. As a
49. 438 U.S. at 747. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969);
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952).
50. 438 U.S. at 747. Outside the home, the balance between the offensive speaker and
the unwilling audience may sometimes tip in favor of the speaker, requiring the offended
listener to turn away. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
51. Federal Communications Commission Reports, 24 F.C.C. 2d 408, 411 (1970).
52. 438 U.S. at 747; 24 F.C.C. 2d at 408.
53. 438 U.S. at 749-50. See also id. at 731 n. 2.
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result, government allocation and regulation of broadcast frequen-
cies are recognized as essential, but subject to the public's right to
receive suitable access to social, political, aesthetic, moral and
other ideas and experiences. 5 Since broadcast has special inherent
problems, FCC regulations, such as common ownership rules"6 and
mandatory access rules,'7 which would otherwise infringe on the
broadcaster's first amendment freedoms, have been upheld.
III. CABLE SYSTEMS DIFFER FROM BROADCASTING COMPANIES AND
REQUIRE GREATER FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
The Pacifica Court emphasized the narrowness of its "pig in
the parlor" rationale and stressed that distinctions must be made
between different broadcast media. "This case does not involve a
two-way radio conversation between a cab driver and a dispatcher,
or a telecast of an Elizabethan comedy. We have not decided that
an occasional expletive in either setting would justify any sanc-
tion.' ' " Thus, one of the questions Pacifica leaves unanswered is
whether its rule for broadcast must be extended to cable television.
If so, the FCC, states and/or municipalities may more freely im-
pose time, place and manner restrictions on indecent material
shown on cable television. If not, then the first amendment protec-
tion afforded cable television will more closely resemble that of
newspapers, books and motion pictures.
Historically, the courts and the FCC have repeatedly asserted
that cable systems are not broadcasters. They have contended that
cable systems are neither broadcasters nor common carriers within
the meaning of the Communications Act, but a hybrid of both, re-
quiring identification and regulation as a separate force in commu-
nications. e Although the United States Supreme Court has yet to
address the issue of first amendment rights of cable operators, it
55. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 799 (1978); Co-
lumbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic Natl Comm., 412 U.S. at 101-02; Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 388-90; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,
319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943).
56. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 800.
57. Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
58. 438 U.S. at 750.
59. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 161-64 (1968); Mid-
west Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1036, 1036 n.23 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd on other
grounds, 440 U.S. 689 (1979); Order of Dec. 7, 1977, 67 F.C.C. 2d 252 (1977); Report and
Order of Apr. 1, 1976, 59 F.C.C. 2d 294, 299 (1976); Cable Television Report and Order of
Feb. 2, 1972, 36 F.C.C. 2d 143, 211 (1972); Report and Order of Apr. 13, 1959, 26 F.C.C. 403,
427-29 (1959). See also Geller and Lampert, Cable, Content Regulation and the First
Amendment, 32 CArm. U.L. Rzv. 603 (1983).
[Vol. 1:79
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has noted that the question "is not frivolous." 0 The Court will
probably follow the lower courts which have addressed the issue
and prescribe different standards in the first amendment area, 1
because the Court has distinguished broadcasting and cable casting
in other areas of the law."
As early as the 1940's, community antenna television systems
(CATV) have been designed to bring better and more distant
broadcast signals into the home. Since then, cable systems have
developed into a medium with enough channels in each community
(over 100 at this time) to accommodate both the retransmission of
broadcast television programs and origination and retransmission
of special services, such as sports, weather and entertainment pro-
gram services." At first, the FCC avoided regulation of cable tele-
vision altogether. However, as cable television began to compete
with broadcast television, the FCC asserted jurisdiction to prevent
fragmentation of audiences and revenues between local broadcast-
ers and competing cable systems which were bringing distant sig-
nals into local markets.64 Although federal laws and FCC regula-
tions expressly provided that cable television was not broadcasting,
the Supreme Court upheld FCC regulation of cable television, but
only to the extent that it is "reasonably ancillary to the effective
performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the
regulation of television broadcasting. ''1 s Any other regulation
would be impermissible.
In FCC v. Midwest Video Corp.,6e The Supreme Court halted
the FCC's attempts to encroach into the cable television field. Nar-
rowly limiting the authority of the FCC, the Court found that
mandatory access rules, which were valid as to broadcast, were in-
valid as to cable television because they impermissibly abrogated
"the cable operators' control over the composition of their pro-
gramming."' 7 Several lower courts went further and found that the
60. Midwest Video, 440 U.S. at 709 n. 19.
61. See Cruz v. Ferre, 571 F. Supp. 125 (S.D. Fla. 1983); Community Television of
Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164 (D. Utah 1982); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkin-
son, 531 F. Supp. 986 (D. Utah 1982).
62. See, e.g., Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 415 U.S. 394
(1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
63. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 21-22 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
829 (1977).
64. Id. at 22.
65. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968); United States
v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
66. 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
67. Id. at 701. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), and
19841
9
Hartglass: Indecency on Cable Television
Published by Institutional Repository, 1984
88 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
technological differences between broadcasting and cable television
justify differences in their first amendment regulation and protec-
tion. The United States Court of Appeals in Home Box Office, Inc.
v. FCC, distinguished the two media in its discussion of first
amendment protection:
The First Amendment theory espoused in National Broadcast-
ing Co. and reaffirmed in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. cannot be
directly applied to cable television since an essential precondi-
tion of that theory - physical interference and scarcity requir-
ing an umpiring role for government - is absent. Interference
among speakers on a single cable is controlled by electrical
equipment which divides the cable into channels and by the
owners of the cable system who determine who shall have access
to each channel and for how long. Nor is there any apparent
physical scarcity of channels relative to the number of persons
who may seek access to the cable system .... Technology is now
available that would increase capacity to 80 channels, and in the
future channel capacity may become unlimited."
In Home Box Office, the court invalidated FCC anti-siphoning
rules which regulated and limited the programming fare cable op-
erators could offer to the public for a fee. Although substantially
similar rules for broadcast television had previously been upheld in
national Association of Theatre Owners (NATO) v. FCC,69 these
rules as applied to pay cable television were violative of the first
amendment. The court held that NATO v. FCC was not control-
ling because of the "important differences" between cable and
broadcast television. 70 Thus, even though the rules did not go so
far as to constitute content regulations on cable television, the
court found them violative of the first amendment.
71
Three recent cases focus on the distinctions between broad-
casting and cable that make Pacifica inapplicable to cable casting.
In Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson 7 and Community Televi-
sion of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City,73 a federal district court judge inval-
idated legislation prohibiting the distribution of "indecent" mate-
rial over cable television. The court in Roy City outlined the
distinctions between cable and broadcasting that mandated the
compare with Red Lion Broadcasting, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
68. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d at 44-46.
69. 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970).
70. 567 F.2d at 43.
71. Id. at 49.
72. 531 F. Supp. 986 (D. Utah 1982).
73. 555 F. Supp. 1164 (D. Utah 1982).
[Vol. 1:79
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result:
Cable
1. User needs to subscribe.
2. User holds power to cancel
subscription.
3. Limited advertising.
4. Transmittal through wires.
5. User receives signal on private cable.
6. User pays a fee.
7. User receives preview of coming
attractions.
8. Distributor or distributee may add
services and expand spectrum of.
signals or channels and choices.
9. Wires are privately owned.
Broadcast
User need not subscribe.
User holds no power to cancel. May
complain to F.C.C., station, network
or sponsor.
Extensive advertising.
Transmittal through public airways.
User appropriates signal from the
public airwaves.
User does not pay a fee.
User receives daily and weekly listing
in public press or commercial guides.
Neither distributor nor distributee
may add services or signals or
choices.
Airways are not privately owned but
are publicly controlled."
In addition, the Roy City court noted that cable provides
choices that broadcast does not: to choose to subscribe or not to
subscribe, resulting in a private contract; to choose among various
services, such as HBO or certain sports events; to choose among a
large number of channel and subject choices; and to choose to can-
cel or not to cancel. It also recognized that television by wire does
not have the "pervasiveness" of broadcasting over the airwaves.
Cable signals travel only upon request and for a fee, so that they
are not available everywhere. One must actively contract to sub-
scribe to a cable service, hook-up, and maintain the right to take
signals from the wire by periodic payments to the supplier." As a
result, the Roy City court held that the Pacifica standard is inap-
plicable to cable television. Instead, the Miller standard applies,
which "is a national standard with a core of uniformity which al-
lows for a degree of flexibility at a community level. It may be
uniformely applied to almost all forms of publicly available com-
munication. Books, magazines, cassettes, periodicals, movies, and
cable television are all treated essentially in the same fashion."" e
Thus, under these two lower court cases, cable television should
receive the greater first amendment protection afforded the various
other modes of communication outside of broadcasting.
74. Id. at 1167.
75. Id. at 1168-69.
76. Id. at 1169; see also 531 F. Supp. at 993-1002.
77. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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Similarly, in the third, more recent case, Cruz v. Ferre, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
permanently enjoined the City of Miami from enforcing its "inde-
cency ordinance. ' 78 The court stated that:
The ordinance subject to review by this court prohibits far
too broadly the transmission of indecent materials through cable
television. The ordinance's prohibition is wholesale, without re-
gard to the time of day or other variables indispensable to the
decision in Pacifica. The rationale of Pacifica applies only to
broadcasting. The medium of cable television presents different
first amendment concerns; therefore, Pacifica is inapposite.7'
Thus, the court found the ordinance's wholesale prohibition of in-
decency on cable television to exceed the limits of regulation set
forth in Miller, rendering it unconstitutional.
Curiously, the legislation involved in each of the three cases
strictly prohibited, rather than regulated, the distribution of inde-
cent material by cable television. Each of the district courts noted
that Miller only permitted the prohibition of obscenity, and not
indecency. Although they found that Pacifica is inapposite as ap-
plied to cable television, it would be interesting to see the results
of an attack on indecency legislation with some time, place and
manner conditions. It might be more difficult for a court to strike
down an ordinance that does not completely ban the transmission
of indecent materials through cable television.
Although the Supreme Court in Pacifica did not state whether
its holding applied to cable television, it indicated that "differences
between radio, television, and perhaps closed-circuit transmis-
sions" may be relevant in determining this question8s The current
state of the art in cable television technology permits the cable
programmer to nearly eliminate the problems of accessibility to
children and pervasiveness that troubled the Court about broad-
casting in Pacifica. Late night scheduling reduces the likelihood of
78. Cruz v. Ferro, 571 F. Supp. 125 (S.D. Fla. 1983). Ordinance No. 9538 provided, in
pertinent part:
Section 1. No person shall be means of a cable television system knowingly
distribute by wire or cable any obscene or indecent material.
Section 2. The following words have the following meanings:
(g) "indecent material" means material which is a representation or descrip-
tion of a human sexual or excretory organ or function which the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, would find to be patently offen-
sive. Miami, Fla., Ordinance 9538 (Jan. 13, 1983).
79. Cruz v. Ferre, 571 F. Supp. at 131.
80. 438 U.S. at 750.
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children in the audience. Channels dedicated exclusively for adult
programming eliminate unexpected program content. The pay-per-
view system, activated by a credit card, compels the viewer to con-
sciously select an adult program, thus eliminating any surprises. A
feature may be added to allow the viewer to prescreen a program
for two minutes. Under an addressable system, a viewer orally re-
quests by telephone that a certain channel carrying adult programs
be activated. To prevent unauthorized use, he is required to recite
a personal identification code. Alternatively, an adult programming
channel may be controlled by a lock box, or the adult programming
may be scrambled, and the viewer provided with a lockable de-
coder. 8" As a result, current systems in the cable industry substan-
tially reduce those problems which justify limited first amendment
protection for broadcast. For these reasons alone, Pacifica should
be inapplicable to cable operators.
Outside of the first amendment area, the courts have histori-
cally distinguished cable systems from broadcasters. In 1961, a dis-
trict court found that a community antenna service neither un-
fairly competed nor was unjustly enriched when it transmitted
through its coaxial cables the programs of television stations, with-
out their consent, to individual subscribers.8 2 The court explained
that the companies were not "engaged in the same kind of
business: 8
Plaintiffs are in the business of selling their broadcasting
time and facilities to the sponsors to whom they look for their
profits. They do not and cannot charge the public for their
broadcasts which are beamed directly, indiscriminately and
without charge through the air to any and all reception sets of
the public as may be equipped to receive them.
Defendants, on the other hand, have nothing to do with
sponsors, program content or arrangement. They sell community
antenna service to a segment of the public for which the plain-
tiff's programs were intended but which is not able, because of
location or topographical condition, to receive them without re-
broadcast or other relay service by community antenna. Any
profit to defendants must come from the public for this
service8s
81. See generally, M. HAMBURG, ALL ABOUT CABLE, §6.05[3] (1981).
82. Intermountain Broadcasting Television Corp. v. Idaho Microwave, Inc., 196 F.
Supp. 315 (S.D. Idaho 1961). See also Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 47, 55
(S.D. Idaho, 1962), vacated on other grounds; 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 989 (1965).
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In 1972, the fourth circuit upheld an allegedly discriminatory
nonduplication rule, which denied community antenna television
systems, but not broadcast companies, the right to duplicate net-
work fare in some areas." To support its decision, the court stated,
"since broadcasters function as transmitters of signals, they differ
from CATV which facilitates the reception of signals." 5
In two copyright infringement cases, the United States Su-
preme Court held that the transmission by a cable operator did not
constitute a "performance" within the purview of the Copyright
Act." The Court stated:
The function of CATV systems has little in common with
the function of broadcasters. CATV systems do not in fact
broadcast or rebroadcast. Broadcasters select the programs to be
viewed, CATV systems simply carry, without editing, whatever
programs they receive. Broadcasters procure programs and
propagate them to the public; CATV systems receive programs
that have been released to the public and carry them by private
channels to additional viewers. We hold that CATV operators,
like viewers and unlike broadcasters, do not perform the pro-
grams that they receive and carry.87
In 1978, the eight circuit held that the FCC has the power to
impose mandatory access rules, requiring access channels for free
use by public, educational and governmental bodies, upon broad-
casters, but not upon cable companies." The court asserted,
"Neither the basic rationale for regulation of common carriers (to
insure fair and equal access to the carrier's service) nor that for
regulation of broadcast transmissions (to preclude bedlam on
broadcast frequencies), is applicable to cable systems per se."89
In 1981, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held
that the state of West Virginia could impose different taxing poli-
cies on cable television systems and broadcasting companies with-
out violating the constitutional guarantees of equal protection and
equal and uniform taxation." It stated that CATV systems and
conventional television broadcasters do not offer the same product
84. Winchester TV Cable Co. v. FCC, 462 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1007 (1972).
85. Id. at 118.
86. See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 415 U.S. 394 (1974);
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
87. 415 U.S. at 403; 392 U.S. at 400.
88. Midwest Video, 571 F.2d at 1025.
89. Id. at 1036.
90. Capital Cablevision v. Hardesty, 285 S.E.2d 412 (W. Va. 1981).
[Vol. 1:79
14
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 6
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol1/iss1/6
INDECENCY ON CABLE TELEVISION
or service: television broadcasters generate and transmit broadcast
signals to the general public, while CATV system operators en-
hance and facilitate reception of those signals.91
In sum, cable television has been treated differently than
broadcast in areas such as siphoning, copyright law and taxation.
Careful analysis is required before applying the same law to both
media because they are distinguishable. Therefore, applying first
amendment broadcast law to cable television is impermissible
without some firm justification."
IV. STATE'S INTEREST IN PROTECTING CHILDREN DOES NOT JusIY
STRICTER STANDARDS FOR CABLE TELEVISION
As stated earlier, Pacifica's two justifications for providing
broadcast with more limited first amendment protection were the
"privacy in the home" and the "protection of children" ratio-
nales." Clearly, the "privacy in the home" justification is inappli-
cable to cable television. Anyone desiring such privacy from intru-
sions by this private medium need not subscribe. Thus, unlike
broadcast, the "privacy in the home" rationale cannot justify more
limited first amendment protection for cable television.
The second rationale was that the unique accessibility of
broadcast to children, coupled with the government's interest in
the "well-being of its youth," justified special treatment of the
broadcast of indecent language. However, the "protection of chil-
dren" rationale has failed as applied to other media forms, includ-
91. Id. at 419-20. Cf. Times Mirror v. Connecticut Public Utility Control, 9 MEDIA L.
REP. 1270, 1273 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1983); Connecticut Television Service, Inc. v. Public Utili-
ties Comm., 159 Conn. 317, 330 (Conn. 1970); (additional cases distinguishing cable televi-
sion from broadcast television).
92. Pacilica has been applied outside of the broadcast area, but the justifications have
been limited to the "protection of children" and "privacy in the home" rationales.
See New York v. Ferber, 102 S. Ct. 3348 (1982) (prohibition against knowingly promot-
ing a sexual performance by a child under the age of 16 by distributing material depicting
such a performance); Reeves v. McConn, 631 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1980), reh'g denied, 638
F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1981) (prohibition against the amplification of words or sounds that are
"obscene" with no further definition of that term); Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School
Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 715 n. 20 (D. Mass. 1978) (distinguishing a library setting from
the home); Hinze v. Superior Court of Marin Cty., 119 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 174 Cal. Rptr. 403
(1981) (permitting suspension of students for committing obscene acts or engaging in habit-
ual profanity or vulgarity); Hott v. State, 400 N.E.2d 206 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1132 (1981) (prohibition against indecent telephone calls).
These rationales should not apply to cable television. See supra text accompanying
notes 74-79, 105-06.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 49-53.
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ing cable television." In Ginsberg v. New York, 95 the United States
Supreme Court expressed the view that minors are entitled to a
significant measure of first amendment protection, and only in rel-
atively narrow and well-defined circumstances may government
bar public dissemination of protected materials to them." In that
case, the Supreme Court upheld a conviction under a narrowly
confined statute which prohibited the sale of obscene material to
minors. The Court recognized the primary role of the parents' au-
thority in their own homes to direct the rearing of their children,
but stated that the statute did not interfere with that right be-
cause parents who so desire could buy such materials (such as
magazines) for their children.97 In addition, the Court found that
the statute rationally protected the state's independent interest in
the well-being of its youth to safeguard them from "abuses. '" 8
However, the following year in Stanley v. Georgia," the Court
held that the first and fourteenth amendments prohibit making
the mere private possession of obscene material a crime. 1"0 The
Court rejected the contention that such legislation was necessary
to keep obscene material from falling into the hands of children.101
Instead, it upheld the individual's right to receive information, en-
tertainment and ideas, regardless of social worth, and found as
fundamental the right to be free from unwanted government intru-
sions into one's privacy.10 2 The Court stated, "if the First Amend-
ment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling
a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or
what films he may watch.' 0 8 Consequently, the law prohibiting
possession of such materials failed for overbreadth because unlike
the law prohibiting the sale to children, it would have a chilling
effect on the first amendment rights of adults.
Next in Miller v. California, the Court recognized that "the
States have a legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination or
exhibition of obscene material when the mode of dissemination
94. See Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164 (D. Utah
1982); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 986 (D. Utah 1982).
95. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
96. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. at 212-13; Home Box Office, Inc.
v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. at 996.
97. 390 U.S. at 639.
98. Id. at 640-41.
99. 394 U.S.LW. 557 (1969).
100. Id. at 568.
101. Id. at 567.
102. Id. at 564.
103. Id. at 565.
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carries with it a significant danger of offending the sensibilities of
unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles. ' 104 The court in
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, however, refused to extend this
rule to "[sipeech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to
some other legitimate proscription."'105 Such speech "cannot be
suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a
legislative body thinks unsuitable for them. In most circum-
stances, the values protected by the First Amendment are no less
applicable when government seeks to control the flow of informa-
tion to minors."'0 6 Consequently, the Court in Erznoznik invali-
dated a city ordinance prohibiting the exhibition of a motion pic-
ture containing nudity that is visible from public streets. Likewise,
Miller's rule should not be extended to indecent material on cable
television.
In addition, the Erznoznik Court found the ordinance to be
overbroad. It prohibited all nudity, and not all nudity is obscene.
Thus, the Court struck down the ordinance for prohibiting pro-
tected speech, notwithstanding the likely result that some children
would view offensive films. The Court also recognized that the bur-
den normally falls upon the viewer to "avert his eyes.' '
As a result, the "protection of children" rationale has gener-
ally been limited to those situations in which (1) no parents are
present to exercise their discretion regarding their children's view-
ing or reading material; and (2) parents cannot practically exercise
the appropriate degree of control due to the nature of the
communication.' 8
Dissemination of information over cable television falls into
neither category. Unlike radio broadcasting, cable television is
designed primarily to go into the home and cannot be received in
unsupervised locales, i.e., the playground, the park, an automobile
or the beach. Thus, there is a higher degree of parental control
over young cable television viewers. Second, the levels of choice ex-
ercised by the parents in the decision to receive cable television
and premium services gives the parents additional control over its
dissemination to their children. Third, the availability to lock-out
devices gives the parents an additional control over the availability
of the cable programming to their children. Consequently, cable
104. 413 U.S. at 18-19 (footnote and cites omitted; emphasis added).
105. 422 U.S. at 213.
106. Id. at 213-14 (footnote and cites omitted; emphasis added).
107. Id. at 211-13.
108. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 726; Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 629.
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television is not so easily available to children as to justify content
regulation.'10
Even if ordinances and statutes could justifiably regulate the
distribution by cable of indecent material, they would have to be
carefully drafted to withstand constitutional attacks of over-
breadth. Assuming, arguendo, that the "protection of children" ra-
tionale were acceptable, legislation failing to refer to children will
apply equally to all places receiving cable programming, including
those without children. Consequently, the programming would be
banned in places frequented only by adults, such as bars and
homes without children. Neither would references to children with-
out mention of age limits be sufficient because permissible viewing
would be the same for teenagers as toddlers. Since such laws would
reduce the entire cable television audience to viewing only what is
fit for children,"10 they have been held as unconstitutionally over-
broad."' Even Pacifica did not permit a complete ban, only time,
place and manner restrictions."'
V. CONCLUSION
Under Miller, state and local governments are permitted to
regulate and prohibit "obscene" material on cable television. How-
ever, the exhibition of "indecent" material on cable television is
protected speech. Pacifica's rule that the broadcast of "indecent
material" may be regulated in certain contexts should not apply to
cable television. Lower court decisions and precedent in other ar-
eas of law support the conclusion that due to the peculiar charac-
teristics of cable television, this medium should be distinguished
from broadcast television and not subject to broadcast's limited
first amendment protection. Legislation prohibiting "indecent"
material on cable television under the "protection of children" ra-
tionale has failed for overbreadth and for ignoring the existence of
devices in cable systems that adequately alleviate the problem of
accessibility to children. Finally, even if Pacifica were applicable,
only regulation in certain context would be permissible, and not an
109. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
110. See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wil-
kinson, 531 F. Supp. at 997; Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488,
494-95, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888, 893 (1981).
111. See Cruz v. Ferre, 571 F. Supp. 125 (S.D. Fla. 1983); Community Television of
Utah v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. at 1164; Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. at
997.
112. See generally Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75-76 (1981);
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750 n. 28; In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 486 n.12 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
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absolute ban. Therefore, the only type of legislation which might
pass constitutional muster would purport to regulate, and not pro-
hibit, the time, place and manner of indecent material on cable
television. However, since the district courts have indicated that
Pacifica is not applicable to cable television at all, such legislation
would probably fail as well.
Lori R. Hartglass
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